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INTRODUCTION
Well after the end of the Civil War, the abolition of slavery, and the pas-
sage of the Fifteenth Amendment, many African Americans were still unable
to effectively exercise their right to vote. Finally, in 1965, Congress sought
to remedy this situation by passing the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"). 2 The bill
was dramatic and controversial, but commentators hail it as one of the most
* J.D. candidate, May 2008. I would like to thank Tim Harker for his tireless editing and
encouragement. I also wish to thank the Center for Individual Rights for providing me with the
invaluable experience of working on this case. Finally, many thanks to Professor Don Herzog, Liz
Ryan, Brittany Parling, and Ben Schweigert for their thoughtful comments and continuous editing.
1. See Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81
DENV. U. L. REv. 225, 228 (2003).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
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effective pieces of legislation of the civil rights movement.3 It codified the
Fifteenth Amendment and gave Congress a means of enforcing its guaran-
tees. As amended, section 2(a) of the VRA provides that
[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
4
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color ....
The main purpose of the legislation was to ensure not only that all citi-
zens had a nominal right to vote, but that they had the ability to make their
vote effective The VRA has substantially achieved that purpose. The num-
ber of minority voters increased dramatically after its passage,6 and while
voting discrimination 7 still exists, the wholesale exclusion of an entire seg-
ment of the American population is no longer an issue.
Although few have quarreled with the purpose or success of the VRA,
the means used to achieve its goals have been controversial and widely dis-
puted. Some critics have questioned the constitutionality of such sweeping
legislation,8 yet the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld its constitutional-
ity,9 and the recent congressional renewal of various sections of the VRA
suggests that it is here to stay.' ° Much of the controversy surrounding the
VRA stems from difficulties in determining its exact scope. As the propor-
tion of minorities in America increases, so does their inherent voting
strength; yet recent years have seen an expansion of the application and
scope of the VRA, along with a parallel increase in attempts to curtail its
II
use.
For example, in several recent cases plaintiffs have argued that sections
of the VRA-such as the section 4 minority language requirement-should
3. Drew S. Days Il, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in CONTROVERSIES
IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 52, 52 (Bernard Grofman &
Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
5. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 5 (1982).
6. See James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Consent Under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443, 449 (1999) ("By 1996, there
were more than 250 black legislators in the eleven southern states, thirty-nine black members of
Congress, and more than 8,200 blacks elected to political office nationwide").
7. For the purposes of this paper, "voting discrimination" means attempts to exclude eligi-
ble voters from the electoral process on the basis of race, sex, or any other pejorative classification.
8. See Pitts, supra note 1, at 225.
9. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980); Georgia v. United States,
411 U.S. 526, 541 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
10. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthoriza-
tion and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
l1. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-946 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for
a break with stare decisis to give an interpretation to section 2 that is more consistent with the text of
the Act and that does not require judicial policymaking).
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apply to the petition circulation process for initiatives." The idea of apply-
ing section 2 of the VRA to the petition process seems unorthodox-the
VRA specifically applies to voting and no voting occurs during this phase-
and courts have struggled with how to address the dilemma. 13 In determining
the scope of section 2, the question then becomes: when the text conflicts
with the underlying purpose of the VRA, which controls? Thus far, three
circuits have held that the text controls and that various sections of the VRA
do not pertain to the petition circulation phase of an initiative. 4 In fact, only
one case, Operation King's Dream v. Connerly,"5 has applied the VRA to the
petition phase of an initiative.
The facts of Operation King's Dream contain no technical violation of
the VRA, yet the alleged behavior may conflict with the ideal democratic
processes the VRA sought to establish. The case arose after the Michigan
Civil Rights Initiative ("MCRI"), a ballot question committee, 6 proposed
Proposal 2 to amend the state constitution to prohibit preferences on the
basis of race, sex, or national origin in hiring or admission decisions at pub-
lic institutions. 17 Proposal 2 was controversial from the outset," and after the
election committee approved the petition, but well before the election, alle-
gations emerged that some petition circulators had fraudulently represented
the purpose of the initiative in order to obtain signatures.' 9 Opponents of the
initiative filed suit. Rather than alleging common law fraud or a violation of
12. Padilla v. Lever (Padilla 11), 463 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissing challenge to a
referendum petition that was not bilingual, pursuant to the requirements of section 203(c) of the
VRA which requires that jurisdictions with a certain percentage of minority-language speakers print
bilingual ballots); Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988) (dismissing challenge to an
initiative petition that was not bilingual pursuant to the requirements of section 203(c) of the VRA);
Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489 (11 th Cir. 1988) (same); Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No.
06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006) (allowing application of section 2 of the
VRA to an initiative petition based on allegations of fraud).
13. Compare Padilla v. Lever (Padilla 1), 429 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
bilingual requirement of the VRA applies to a recall petition), withdrawn en banc, 446 F.3d 963,
(9th Cir. 2006), with Padilla 11, 463 F.3d at 1050-53 (holding that the bilingual requirement of the
VRA does not apply to a referendum petition).
14. Padilla 11, 463 F.3d 1046; Montero, 861 F.2d 603; Delgado, 861 F.2d 1489.
15. 2006 WL 2514115, at *17 (holding that the VRA applied to the acts of the Michigan
petition circulators, but allowing the initiative to remain on the ballot because the evidence of fraud
did not indicate that it was racially targeted). The issue of whether section 2 of the VRA applies to
initiative petitions is currently on appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
16. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 169.202(3) (2004) (" 'Ballot question committee' means a commit-
tee acting in support of, or in opposition to, the qualification, passage, or defeat of a ballot question
but that does not receive contributions or make expenditures or contributions for the purpose of
influencing or attempting to influence the action of the voters for or against the nomination or elec-
tion of a candidate.").
17. Mich. Civil Rights Initiative Comm., Actual Ballot Language (2006), http:H
www.michigancivilrights.org/media/Actual%20Ballot%20Language.pdf.
18. See generally Opposition of Defendants-Appellees Connerly, Gratz, and Michigan Civil
Rights Initiative Committee to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal at 1-
8, Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-2144 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 2006) (providing a summary




state election laws, they sought to apply section 2 to the initiative process
based on the theory that racially-targeted fraud during the circulation proc-
ess would spill over into racially-targeted fraud at the ballot.' Because
Congress intended the VRA to protect the right to vote, the plaintiffs argued
21it should cover anything that hinders that right at any stage of the process.
Under this view, evidence of racially targeted fraud with the potential to
deny or abridge a citizen's right to vote is sufficient to find a violation of
22
section 2, regardless of where in the election process the fraud occurs.
Despite their appealing policy considerations, these legal arguments for
expanding the scope of section 2 are tenuous at best. This Note argues that
interpreting section 2 to exclude initiative proposals during their circulation
phase is the only way to avoid insurmountable statutory construction prob-
lems and constitutional objections. It grounds the theoretical discussion of
the VRA in an analysis of how the court applied section 2 in Operation
King's Dream. Part I provides the legal landscape of a section 2 claim, in-
cluding relevant legislative history and the essential elements of a successful
claim. Part II contends that because no voting takes place during the petition
phase of a proposal, petition circulation can neither deny nor abridge the
right to vote. Part III argues that interpreting section 2 so that it applies to
acts of private citizens would eliminate the state action requirement, thus• • 23
rendering section 2 unconstitutional.
I. BACKGROUND OF SECTION 2 OF THE VRA
This Part begins with an overview of the historical landscape at the time
of the passage of the VRA and the basic means the VRA employed to rem-
edy the situation. Section I.B then traces the major statutory and legal
developments of the VRA since its enactment. Finally, Section I.C lays out
how the court in Operation King's Dream applied this legal analysis to a
situation involving initiative petitions.
A. History and Purpose Behind the Voting Rights Act
After the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, many southern states
used devices such as poll taxes and literacy tests to disenfranchise black
20. Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 1-2, Opera-
tion King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006).
21. Id.
22. See id. at 24-25. This argument is largely one of semantics; the real difficulty lies in
defining exactly when the "election process" begins. Those arguing to extend the scope of section 2
would define the election process as beginning when an initiative petition is first drafted and circu-
lated, while those who argue in favor of a narrower interpretation would define the election process
as beginning once the initiative gains access to the ballot. See infra Section I.A.2.a.
23. There are other serious constitutional implications arising from an extension of section 2,
such as freedom of speech and federalism. Both present compelling arguments for limiting the
scope of section 2, but a full analysis is beyond the scope of this Note.
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voters.24 Because the southern states controlled Congress for much of the
period before the passage of the Voting Rights Act, Congress did little to
stop this disenfranchisement and enforce the guarantees of the Fifteenth
Amendment.2 ' Eventually, however, perhaps galvanized by the Supreme
Court's progressive one-person, one-vote cases26 and by mounting racial
tension over voter registration in the South, 7 Congress passed the Voting
Rights Act in 1965.28 The Supreme Court hailed the VRA as a means to con-
front the "insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain
parts of [the] country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the
Constitution. 29
The VRA pursued its objective of ensuring that no citizen's right to vote
would be "denied or abridged" on account of race or color ° by eliminating
the use of literary tests and other devices often used to disenfranchise mi-
norities," and by requiring all "covered" jurisdictions 32 to obtain
"preclearance" from the Department of Justice ("DOJ") before making any
change in a voting practice or procedure. Three sections of the Voting Rights
Act have emerged as the primary vehicles for enforcing the guarantees of
the Fifteenth Amendment. Section 2 applies nationally, its language closely
tracking that of the Fifteenth Amendment.33 Section 2 cases are analyzed in
terms of "vote dilution"-a violation occurs if the challenged standard,
practice, or procedure dilutes the efficacy of a vote because of the voter's
race. 4 Section 4 "suspended the use of particular exclusionary practices
such as literacy tests."35 Section 5 required that "covered" jurisdictions-
those jurisdictions with extremely low minority voter turnout-seek federal
36preclearance in order to change any voting practices.
24. QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-
1990, at 3 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
25. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 546 (rev. 2d ed. 2002).
26. Katharine Inglis Butler, Racial Fairness and Traditional Districting Standards: Observa-
tions on the Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Geographic Representation, 57 S.C. L. REV. 749,
765 (2006).
27. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 25, at 547.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
29. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (upholding the VRA against
constitutional attack).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) ("Section 2" vote dilution).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) ("Section 4" minority language provision).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) ("Section 5" preclearance requirement).
33. Ellen Katz with Margaret Aisenbrey et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judi-
cial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643,
646 (2006).
34. See Tucker, supra note 6, at 535-36.
35. Katz with Aisenbrey et al., supra note 33, at 646.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c).
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B. The 1982 Amendments and the Supreme Court's Application
of the New Section 2
The VRA had an immediate and dramatic effect, but it took time for liti-
gants to decide which sections of the VRA would best serve their goals. The
Act achieved its primary purpose of assuring equal access to the electoral
process for all citizens, but concerns that blacks were unable to impact elec-
tions to the same extent as whites remained.37 These concerns led citizens of
Mobile, Alabama, to file a lawsuit challenging the at-large city council elec-
toral system under section 2 of the VRA.38 The Supreme Court denied relief,
holding that plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent in order to prevail
under section 2.39 For all practical purposes, this case, City of Mobile v.
Bolden, silenced further section 2 vote-dilution litigation.
4
0
Congress responded to Bolden in 1982 and amended section 2 to pro-
hibit voting practices or procedures that "resulted in a denial of equal
electoral opportunity, regardless of ... intent."4' Congress implemented the
change primarily to make it easier for plaintiffs, who often could not estab-
• 42
lish proof of discriminatory intent, to show that certain practices or
procedures "diluted" the effectiveness of their vote. Amended section 2(a)
reads as follows:
[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
43citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color ....
As a preliminary matter, a case brought under section 2 of the VRA
must allege that a "[s]tate or political subdivision" denied or abridged the
right to vote.44 Section 2 is violated if
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political proc-
esses leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision
are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens pro-
tected by subsection (a) ... in that its members have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice.45
By removing the intent requirement, the amendments revived section 2 as a
viable means of enforcing the goals of the VRA.
37. Katz with Aisenbrey et al., supra note 33, at 647.
38. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
39. Id. at 70.
40. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 25, at 746.
41. Id. at 747.
42. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,44 (1986).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
44. Id.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
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The Supreme Court first addressed the 1982 amendments in Thornburg
v. Gingles,4 in which it established three preconditions that typically must
be satisfied before a section 2 claim can proceed to adjudication on the mer-
its. 47 The minority group challenging the practice must establish that (1) it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
district; (2) it is "politically cohesive"; and (3) the "white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc" so that it usually defeats the minority's preferred can-
didate.8
In a typical section 2 case, after the Gingles factors are satisfied, courts
evaluate the "totality of the circumstances" to determine if vote dilution oc-
curred and if the challenged procedure caused the vote dilution.4 9 A Senate
Judiciary Committee report ("Senate Report") accompanying the 1982
amendments identifies several factors ("the Senate Factors") for courts to
consider when determining if the totality of the circumstances reveal a vio-
lation of section 2.' 0 The Supreme Court has described the Senate Report as
the "authoritative source" on the meaning of the statute." While the Senate
developed these factors specifically for section 2 violations, other relevant
factors are sometimes considered and "there is no requirement that any par-
ticular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one
way or the other."5 2 Ultimately, no firm criteria exist for establishing a viola-
tion of section 2; rather, "the question whether the political processes are
'equally open' depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past
and present reality.' ,13
For section 2 cases in which the Gingles and Senate Factors are not
readily applicable _Such as the initiative petition process-courts have
looked to policy considerations for answers. The Gingles and Senate Factors
46. 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (addressing challenge by black voters in North Carolina of a state-
wide redistricting plan, particularly the use of multimember districts).
47. Id. at 50-51.
48. Id.
49. See Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 594-
95 (9th Cir. 1997) (challenging voter-registration procedure).
50. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982). The Senate Factors include: (1) a history of official
discrimination that impacted the right of minority members to participate in the political process; (2)
the extent to which voting in the elections is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the state has
used "voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the
minority group"; (4) exclusion from access to slating process; (5) the extent to which impacted
minorities bear the effects of discrimination in areas such as education, employment, or health,
which might hinder their ability to participate in the political process; (6) the use of overt or subtle
racial appeals in political campaigns; (7) the extent to which minorities have been elected to office
in the jurisdiction; (8) a lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particular needs
of the minority group; and (9) whether the justification for the challenged policy is "tenuous." Id.
51. SeeGingles, 478U.S. at43n.7.
52. Id. at 45 (quoting S. REP. No. 97-417, at 29).
53. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 97-417, at 30).
54. Such cases are infrequent. See Katz with Aisenbrey et al., supra note 33, at 660 (noting
that of 331 section 2 lawsuits filed since the 1982 amendments, only fourteen plaintiffs have pre-
vailed without addressing them).
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aid courts in identifying instances of direct vote dilution, such as redistrict-
ing.55 Beyond these "vote dilution through submergence" claims, 5 6 there are
section 2 cases that do not implicate the Gingles or Senate Factors because
the discriminatory aspect is indirect. These occasional cases challenge pro-57 ••58
cedures such as voter roll purges, felon disenfranchisement, and
annexation. 9 It is in these cases that the statutory language and underlying
policy considerations become particularly relevant because the impact on
minority voters is a secondary effect of the challenged practice. Supreme
Court cases dealing with challenges to electoral practices other than redis-
tricting "illuminate[] ... important doctrinal, practical, and theoretical
issues." 6 Claims extending section 2 to the initiative petition process would
be of the sort that requires courts to consider these issues because any im-
pact on voting would be indirect. Though it is acceptable for courts in these
situations to take policy concerns under consideration, policy alone is not
enough to contradict the text of section 2.
C. Operation King's Dream
Operation King's Dream is one such case in which the Gingles and Sen-
ate Factors did not readily apply, but where the court reached out to bring
the case within the scope of section 2. The plain language of section 2 re-
quires a plaintiff to show that the organization attempting to place the
initiative on the ballot engaged in some activity that would result in less ac-
cess to the political process for minorities. Applying the requirements of a
section 2 claim to an initiative petition, as in Operation King's Dream, rests
on the premise that the proposition could not get on the ballot without the
use of racially targeted fraud, and so the only way to remove the taint of
fraud is to remove the proposition from the ballot.61 In Operation King's
Dream, the plaintiffs alleged that the MCRI hired petition circulators who
fraudulently targeted black voters by telling them that the petition was "for
affirmative action" or "for civil rights. 6 ' They further alleged that black sig-
natures were essential to obtain white signatures, and thus to ultimately
55. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 25, at 833.
56. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48. The Court used the phrase to refer to a claim that a multimem-
ber system "dilutes [minority] votes by submerging them in a white majority." Id. at 46.
57. Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F3d 306
(3d Cir. 1994) (challenging Pennsylvania's voter registration purge policy).
58. Johnson v. Govemor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (challenging Florida's felon
disenfranchisement policy).
59. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 1999) (challenging a housing
authority's decision not to annex an African-American dominated housing project to the city).
60. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 25, at 833.
61. See Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 2, Opera-
tion King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006).
62. See id. at 6.
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place the petition on the ballot.63 Accordingly, they argued that the only way
to remove the taint of fraud was to remove the proposition from the ballot.
The court in Operation King's Dream agreed with this reasoning, though it
ultimately held that the plaintiffs lacked the necessary evidence of racially
targeted fraud to sustain their claim under the VRA. 4 While this logic per-
suaded the court, applying section 2 in this manner is inconsistent with the
plain language of the statute and the constitutional principles on which it
relies.
II. PETITION CIRCULATION DOES NOT IMPLICATE VOTING
This Part argues that section 2 should not apply to citizen initiative peti-
tion circulation for two fundamental reasons. Section II.A contends that
initiative petitions fail to implicate voting, the very action section 2 was en-
acted to protect. Section II.B argues that, even if a court were to apply
section 2 to an initiative petition, a workable benchmark against which to
compare a person's current ability to vote does not exist in initiative petition
cases.
A. Circulating a Petition Does Not Fit the Definition of Voting
This Section argues that signing a petition does not constitute "voting"
under section 2 of the VRA. The VRA defines the act of voting to include
(1) all prerequisites to voting, (2) casting of a ballot, and (3) the counting of
a ballot. 6- Section II.A. 1 contends that because petition circulation does not
fall into any of these three defined phases of voting, the VRA does not cover
it. Section II.A.2 maintains that section 2 of the VRA does not cover initia-
tive petitions even considering a broader view of voting,66 because courts
should understand the electoral process to begin only once citizens success-
fully place the initiative on the ballot.
1. Narrow Definition of Voting
Signing a petition cannot be interpreted as part of the first phase of vot-
ing-a prerequisite to voting-because it is not a requirement to voting in the
ultimate election. Because the VRA limits "voting" to those actions pertinent
63. Id. at 2.
64. Operation King's Dream, 2006 WL 2514115, at *17.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (2000) ("[Tlhe word 'vote' includes all action necessary to make a
vote effective including, but not limited to, registration or other action required by State law prereq-
uisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having such ballot counted and included in the appropriate
totals of votes cast with respect to candidates for public office and propositions for which votes are
received in an election ... "). While the statutory definition of "vote" is not limited to these three
aspects of voting, Section I.A.2 will show that an expanded definition of voting would not alter the
analysis.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) stating that section 2 is violated where "the political processes




to registering a choice in an election, 7 prerequisites to voting "must be in-
terpreted to be those [actions] which relate directly to the casting of a
ballot."' Registration requirements, age qualifications, and other traditional
prerequisites to voting are just that-pre-voting requirements. There is no
parallel requirement to sign a petition before voting on the resulting initia-
tive, and supporting a petition during circulation does not require voting for
it at an election. Moreover, a state could not make signing a petition a pre-
requisite to voting on the initiative once it is on the ballot, because "[a] state
cannot impede or diminish [the initiative] process so long as it reserves the
right of initiative to the people.' 69 Requiring circulators to offer all people
who might later vote on the initiative the opportunity to sign a petition
would impede the ability of private citizens to exercise their right to legislate
through initiatives. It follows that there is an inherent limit on the amount of
regulation a state can impose.
Signing a petition is distinct from the second phase of voting-casting a
ballot-because the latter involves irreversibly choosing between alterna-
tives, whereas the former does not eliminate alternatives from the ultimate• 70
election. The VRA definition of voting, as well as its meaning within the
legal vernacular,7' implies a choice. At an election each voter finally
7
chooses between often mutually exclusive alternatives, thereby exhausting
his or her civil right to vote in that election. The circulation of a petition
does not involve the same final choice between alternatives and therefore
should not implicate VRA rights. By necessity, a petition must precede a
vote on an initiative; hence they are two separate acts.73 While a petition
may place an unpalatable initiative on the ballot, it does not deny the right to
vote in and of itself.74
Critics of this argument frequently point to the fact that petition circula-
tion does present the citizen with a choice between two alternatives-
namely, the choice to sign or the choice not to sign.75 Although that is true, it
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e).
68. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F2d 603, 607 (10th Cir. 1988).
69. Delgado v. Smith, 861 F2d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1988).
70. Montero, 861 F.2d at 607 ("Implicit in ... the statutory ... definition[] of the concept of
voting is the presence of a choice to be made.").
71. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1606 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a vote as "[tihe expression of
one's preference or opinion.
72. In an election, the result is final even if the election is only a primary election. This is
because the primary will not be re-held. The winner will move on to the ultimate election and all
other choices will be removed from the ballot. The election may not decide the final winner of the
election, but the result is final in the irreversible sense of the word.
73. Montero, 861 F.2d at 607.
74. See Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526, 1531 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that decision to
exclude candidate's name from Republican primary did not deny appellant's fight to vote, despite
limiting the choices that would appear on the ballot).
75. Padilla v. Lever (Padilla 1), 429 F.3d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 2005), withdrawn en banc, 446
E3d 963 (9th Cir. 2006); Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115, at
*13 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006).
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is not a meaningful choice when compared to the choices presented to voters
in casting a ballot. The individual's choice to sign or not to sign is unlikely
16to have a direct impact on the ultimate success of an initiative. If an indi-
vidual chooses to sign, the initiative is one step closer to gaining access to
the ballot. If not, the petition circulator can simply move on to another per-
son. The relatively low signature requirements to place an initiative on a
ballot, 77 compared to the number of votes that will ultimately be required for
a proposal to pass at an election,"' make an individual's refusal to sign a pe-
tition a small hurdle to getting an initiative on the ballot.
For the same reasons, the VRA's guarantee that each vote will be
counted 79 does not apply to initiative petitions. A signature on a petition is
not a vote. Without a vote to be counted, the VRA cannot apply.
2. Broad Definition of Voting
Even under a broader reading, section 2 of the VRA does not appropri-
ately encompass initiative petitions. In contrast to the narrow reading, the
language of section 2 can also be read to include the entire "electoral proc-
ess"80 and all "standards, practices, or procedures"'" with respect to voting.
Section II.A.2.a argues that the only workable definition of "electoral proc-
ess" is one that does not begin until after an initiative has been placed on the
ballot, thus excluding initiative petition circulation. Section II.A.2.b shows
that the circulation of an initiative petition cannot properly be characterized
as a "standard, practice or procedure" with respect to voting.
76. Cf. Montero, 861 F.2d at 607 (arguing those who are opposed to an initiative have no
recourse other than to not sign the petition or to speak out against it, and there is not formal means
to register opposition). Thus, an individual's refusal to sign a petition will only prevent the place-
ment of an initiative on the ballot if an overwhelming majority of citizens refuse to sign. To get the
required number of signatures, only three percent of the Michigan population would need to sign the
petition. Only 317,757 signatures were required. See Opposition of Defendants-Appellees Connerly,
Gratz, and Michigan Civil Rights Initiative Committee to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary In-
junction Pending Appeal at 6, Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-2144 (6th Cir. Sept. 7,
2006) as a population of 10,120,860. U.S. Census Bureau, Michigan QuickFacts from the U.S.
Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26000.html (last visited, 2007).
77. MICH. CONsT. art. XII, § 2 (requiring signatures equal in number to ten percent of the
total vote cast for governor in the preceding election).
78. For example, MCRI was required to obtain 317,757 signatures in order to get Proposal 2
on the ballot, and they received over 508,000 signatures. See Opposition of Defendants-Appellees
Connerly, Gratz, and Michigan Civil Rights Initiative Committee to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Prelimi-
nary Injunction Pending Appeal at 5-6, Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-2144 (6th Cir.
Sept. 7, 2006). 2,137,574 votes were cast in favor of Proposal 2 on November 7, 2006 (with
1,552,459 votes against the Proposition). CNN.com, 6: Key Ballot Measures, http://www.cnn.coml
ELECTION/2006/pages/results/ballot.measures/ (last visited, Apr. 14, 2007).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (2000).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (stating that section 2 is violated when "the political processes
leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to partici-
pation") (emphasis added).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) ("No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied... ") (emphasis added).
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a. Circulating a Petition is Not a Part of the Electoral Process
Legal precedent and legislative history support an interpretation of the
electoral process that begins after an initiative has been placed on the ballot.
Despite its broad language, "[s]ection 2 does not prohibit all voting restric-
tions that may have a racially disproportionate effect. ' 2 While the definition
of "electoral process" is unsettled, the majority of courts interpreting the
VRA have refused to extend coverage to processes not clearly related to the
casting of a ballot.8 3 Since an initiative is not yet on a ballot, petition circula-
tion cannot properly be considered a phase of the electoral process.4
Administrative interpretations of the VRA also support excluding petitions
85from section 2 coverage. The DOJ interpretations of the VRA specifically
mention petitions in respect to section 5 but not in respect to section 2, sug-
gesting that the DOJ was cognizant of the role petitions play in the electoral
16process but chose not to address them in the context of section 2. The re-
cent renewal of certain portions of the VRA in 200687 also provided both
Congress and the DOJ an opportunity to comment on the extent to which
petition circulation should be covered by the requirements of the VRA.
Given the recent difficulty of the Ninth Circuit in determining how to fit
petitions into the VRA, s both the DOJ and Congress must have been awareof the ambiguity, and had ample opportunity to clarify its scope.89
82. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11 th Cir. 2005) ("Congress amended
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act to make clear that certain practices and procedures that result in the
denial or abridgment of the right to vote are forbidden...... (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.
380, 383 (1991))).
83. See, e.g., Padilla v. Lever (Padilla 11), 463 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006); Delgado v.
Smith, 861 F.2d 1489, 1497 (11th Cit. 1988) (citing Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir.
1988)) (holding that the electoral process does not begin until the Secretary of State certifies that the
initiative is qualified for placement on the ballot).
84. See Montero, 861 F.2d at 606-07.
85. While it is unnecessary to look to advisory opinions when congressional intent is clear, it
is appropriate to look to them for guidance when congressional intent is unclear, as it is in regards to
the exact scope of the electoral process. See infra Section II.A.2.b for a discussion of the improper
use of DOJ interpretations when congressional intent is clear.
86. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.13(j) (2006) (providing that "[a]ny change affecting the necessity of
or methods for offering issues and propositions for approval by referendum" would be covered
under section 5's preclearance requirement); id. § 51.55 (failing to mention petitions in the context
of section 2).
87. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthoriza-
tion and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
88. Compare Padilla v. Lever (Padilla 1), 429 F.3d 910, withdrawn en banc, 446 F.3d 963
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the bilingual requirement of the VRA applies to a recall petition) with
Padilla I1, 463 F.3d 1046 (holding that the bilingual requirement of the VRA does not apply to a
referendum petition).
89. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 290-
91 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the "reenactment rule" of statutory construction which says that if
Congress reenacts legislation that the Supreme Court has interpreted without changing the text then
Congress is said to have ratified the Court's interpretation of the statute).
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Critics argue that the legislative history to the 1982 amendments support
a more expansive view of the electoral process which would include initia-
tive petitions. The phrase "electoral process," when read to give effect to the
remedial nature of the statute,9° might tempt one to include any process that
bears even a tenuous connection to the electoral process. The legislative his-
tory to the 1982 amendments makes clear that Congress intended section 2
to apply to anything that would deny equal access at any phase of the elec-
toral process.9' The Senate Report refers to section 2 as the "major statutory
prohibition of all voting rights discrimination, 92 designed to eliminate prac-
tices that "result in the denial of equal access to any phase of the electoral
process for minority group members. 93
Yet the injuries alleged in initiative petition cases such as Operation
King's Dream are not the vote dilution injuries Congress designed section 2
to guard against. A typical vote dilution case involves redistricting that di-
lutes the voting strength of a minority bloc, making it practically impossible
for minorities in that district to have their electoral voice heard.94 Defining
the electoral process as beginning after the initiative is on the ballot ensures
that section 2 will only be used to redress injuries against which it was de-
signed to protect. Once the initiative is on the ballot, there will be a vote on
the initiative, and it is at this time that section 2 is needed to ensure against
racial discrimination. Assuming section 2 is effective at the election, minori-
ties will have an equal opportunity to make themselves heard at that time,
nullifying any discrimination that might have occurred previously.
b. Circulating a Petition is Not a "Standard, Practice, or
Procedure" with Respect to Voting
Section 2 of the VRA protects against "denial or abridgement of the
right.., to vote," and it does so by prohibiting the imposition of any "stan-
dard, practice, or procedure" that would cause such a result.95 As with the
phrase "electoral process," no statute defines the phrase "standard, practice,
or procedure." Both judicial interpretations and interpretations by the DOJ,
however, suggest that the circulation of an initiative petition is not a "stan-
dard, practice, or procedure" that has the ability to deny or abridge the right
to vote.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the phrase "standard, practice, or
procedure" precludes any interpretation that would include petition circula-
tion. The Court first addressed this phrase in the context of a section 5
90. See supra Section I.A.
91. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 30 (1982).
92. Id.
94. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
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challenge in Allen v. State Board of Elections.96 The Court later identified
four typologies that the phrase "standards, practices, or procedures" can
represent. 97 The four typologies are (1) changes that involve the manner of
voting, (2) changes that involve candidacy requirements and qualifications,
(3) "changes in the composition of the electorate that may vote for candi-
dates for a given office," and (4) changes that create or abolish an elective
office.9 s Although Allen was a section 5 case, it references the legislative
history of section 2,99 suggesting that the interpretation of this phrase can be
applied to the identical language in section 2. Since circulating a petition
cannot properly be described as fitting into any of these four categories, it
does not fall within the Supreme Court's interpretation of a "standard, prac-
tice, or procedure" in the context of the VRA.
Paradoxically, those who argue that section 2 includes petition circula-
tion within its scope often cite Allen in support of their position.'0 This
cross-application of Allen exists because jurists widely understand Allen to
stand for the proposition that courts should broadly interpret the VRA in
order to effectuate its remedial purposes.'0 ' Those in favor of including peti-
tion circulation within the scope of section 2 emphasize that in Allen, the
Court held that the phrase "standard, practice, or procedure" should be in-
terpreted to cover discrimination in all procedures that affect the ballot's
contents, including signature requirements for primary elections.02 Conse-
quently they claim that because the circulation of a petition is necessary to
• _ - 103
trigger a vote on the initiative, the standards, practices, and procedures
used to circulate a petition should be considered parallel to the nomination104 5
process, a process to which the VRA applies. IOs
This reliance on an expansive reading of Allen is misguided, however,
because initiative petition signature requirements do not fit into any of the
96. 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (deciding four separate cases and interpreting whether the changes
involved were "standards, practices, or procedures" subject to the preclearance requirement).
97. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491,502 (1992) (holding that section 5
does not cover changes other than changes in the rules governing voting). The Court noted that these
four typologies are not necessarily exhaustive, id., but later cases have all fallen into these four
factual contexts.
98. Id. at 502-03.
99. Allen, 393 U.S. at 566-67.
100. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F2d 603, 608 (10th Cir. 1988); Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489,
1492 (11 th Cir. 1988).
101. See Allen, 393 U.S. at 565-66.
102. See Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 17, Op-
eration King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006)..
103. Padilla v. Lever (Padilla I1), 463 F.3d 1046, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2006). See generally,
Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Operation King's Dream,
2006 WL 2514115.
104. Delgado, 861 F.2d at 1498 (Anderson, J., dissenting) ("The nomination petition in Allen
was a stage in the electoral process comparable to the petition process in this case.").
105. Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 206 (1996). For a full discussion of the
implications from Morse, see infra Section IlI.C.
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four typologies on which Allen relied. While the Court in Allen did not spe-
cifically note which of the four typologies the increased signature requirement
would be classified in, it would most likely be the second typology-"changes
that involve candidacy requirements and qualifications"-because a candidate
is now required to gather more signatures before gaining access to the bal-
lot.'06 This second typology refers specifically to requirements for candidacy
and as such would not apply to requirements for initiative petitions. Because
initiative petition requirements cannot fit into any of the other three typolo-
gies, initiative petition circulation is not a "standard, practice, or procedure"
under Allen.
Furthermore, the intrinsic differences between petition circulations and
primary elections'07 preclude application of Allen to initiative petition circu-
lation. Petitions have binary outcomes-they either succeed in placing a
particular initiative on the ballot, or they do not. Thus, voters may ultimately
have the opportunity to support or disagree with the initiative, provided that
such opportunity is contingent upon a successful petition process. With ei-
ther outcome, the ability to cast an effective vote is uninhibited. Conversely,
primary elections result in the nomination of one candidate at the exclusion
of all others. A citizen's ability to vote in a later election is thus construc-
tively inhibited in that choices that were previously available to him have
now been eliminated.
Some of the DOJ's interpretations of the VRA have referenced petitions,
but these interpretations conflict with the plain meaning of the statute. Some
courts have mistakenly treated the DOJ's interpretations as authoritative,
08
but such reliance neglects the Supreme Court's holding that administrative
interpretations should be given deference only when Congressional intent is
unclear. ° In Presley v. Etowah County Commission, the Court refused to
follow the Attorney General's interpretations of section 5's "standard, prac-
tice, or procedure" language because the statute itself expressly limits
coverage to changes in rules governing voting."° The court held that section
5 was "unambiguous with respect to the question whether it covers changes
other than changes in rules governing voting,"" but left open questions per-
taining to particular rules." 2 While the sections of the Act are different, the
language is identical, and the plain language of the statute unambiguously
shows that section 2 refers only to rules governing voting. Thus, deference
to administrative interpretations is unnecessary.
106. See Allen, 393 U.S. at 570.
107. For further discussion on the distinction between primaries and initiative petitions, see
infra Section III.C.
108. See NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 178-79 (1985) (hold-
ing that changes in election dates without preclearance were a violation of section 5).
109. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).





Even if one were to look to the interpretations of the DOJ for guidance,
the interpretations themselves are not perfectly clear. For example, the DOJ
understood the preclearance and minority language requirements to apply to
petitions,"3 but also stated that section 5 does not apply to the conduct of
political campaigns." 4 When the DOJ discusses purely procedural matters
such as the font, language, and size of the ballot, it also interprets the re-
quirements to apply to petitions. " - However, when it addresses content as
opposed to form-such as with political campaign conduct-the DOJ as-
serts that the VRA does not apply." 6 Petition circulation is analogically
similar to political campaign conduct (that is to say it implicates content-
based issues, not format based issues) since both are aimed at achieving a
result in an election-whether it be electing a particular candidate or pass-
ing a particular initiative.
B. Section 2 Benchmark Requirement Is Not Satisfied
Assuming a court were to find that an initiative petition did implicate
voting, the next obstacle it would encounter would be to determine a worka-
ble benchmark against which to compare a person's current ability to vote.
In so doing, a court would look to section 5 of the VRA because courts have
evaluated section 2 and section 5 in much the same way and often look to
jurisprudence on one to help inform a decision on the other."7 Both section 2
and section 5 have a benchmark requirement, or a baseline against which the
challenged practice will be compared. Courts must analyze section 5 to de-
termine if a challenged practice is "retrogressive," or will undermine
minority voting power." ' The benchmark under this standard is clear: a pro-
posed change is measured against the existing voting method to determine if
adopting the change would result in retrogression. "9 Unlike section 5, how-
ever, a section 2 case has no pre-existing benchmark. As the term vote
dilution suggests, section 2 requires a "norm with respect to which the fact
113. 28 C.ER. § 51.130) (2006) (applying preclearance requirement to petitions); id. § 55.19
(applying minority language provision to petitions).
114. 28 C.F.R. § 51.7.
115. 28 C.F.R. § 51.130) (applying preclearance requirement to petitions); id. § 55.19 (apply-
ing minority language provision to petitions).
116. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.130), 55.19.
117. The Supreme Court has said that the coverage of section 2 and section 5 is the same,
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 401-02 (1991), but the scope of each is not always parallel,
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883 (1994). The Holder Court reasoned that although the "standard,
practice, or procedure" language of section 2 is identical to that used in section 5, the analysis under
each is different because section 5 applies only to covered jurisdictions, and to proposed changes in
voting procedures within covered jurisdictions. Holder, 512 U.S. at 883. Section 2 applies nationally
and vote dilution claims are analyzed under the Gingles factors and the totality of the circumstances
test. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
118. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479-85 (2003) (holding that the proper inquiry to
determine if there has been a violation of section 5 is a retrogression analysis).
119. Holder, 512 U.S. at 883.
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of dilution may be ascertained."' 20 Although the goal of section 2 is to ensure
equal access to participation, this is not the norm, and it is highly improb-
able that a state of affairs will ever exist where each person has identical
access to the political process.' 2' Thus, unlike a section 5 claim where there
is always a pre-defined benchmark to be used in the retrogression analysis,
"a benchmark does not exist by definition in § 2 dilution cases.' 22 A court
hearing a section 2 suit "must find a reasonable alternative practice as a
benchmark against which to measure the existing voting practice', 23 This
search is usually unproblematic because most section 2 cases deal with re-
districting, in which case the efficacy of the minorities' vote in the old dis-
trict can be used as the benchmark. However, in those cases "where there is
no objective and workable standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark by
which to evaluate a challenged voting practice, it follows that the voting
practice cannot be challenged as dilutive under § 2. ' 24
Initiative petition circulation is "inherently standardless," and as a result
cannot satisfy the section 2 benchmark requirement. '2 The court in Opera-
tion King's Dream did not specifically address the benchmark requirement,
nor was an appropriate benchmark suggested by the plaintiffs. Although
endless possible benchmarks can be imagined, 26 "it is one thing to say that a
benchmark can be found, quite another to give a convincing reason for find-
ing it in the first place."'' 27 Further, the mere existence of a conceivable
benchmark in Operation King's Dream provides no reason to believe that it
would affect vote dilution concerns. Requiring circulators to present every
citizen with an opportunity to sign a petition would make initiative petitions
impractical and unrealistic. Setting up petition signing booths would seem
to nullify the need for an ultimate election. Because no discernable bench-
mark exists against which courts can analyze claims of vote dilution in
petition circulation cases, section 2 claims brought to challenge petitions
must fail.
120. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 88 (1986) (quoting Miss. Republican Executive
Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002, 1012 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from summary affir-
mance)).
121. For example, those who are close to a polling station, or those who do not need to work,
will have an easier time getting to the polls and will be more likely to vote as a result.
122. Holder, 512 U.S. at 884.
123. Id. at 880.
124. Id. at881.
125. See id. at 889 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. For example, circulators could be required to go door-to-door and present the petition to
every citizen, or there could be designated petition booths where citizens can go in and sign the
petition if they desire.
127. Holder, 512 U.S. at 882.
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III. THERE Is No STATE ACTION IN THE
PETITION CIRCULATION PROCESS
The VRA applies only to states and political subdivisions of states.12 As
such, discrimination by private citizens is not a VRA violation. 2 9 This Part
argues that challenges to petition circulation do not meet the state action
requirement of the VRA for three reasons. Section III.A argues that indi-
viduals involved in a petition circulation process are private citizens and the
VRA therefore does not apply to them. Section III.B demonstrates that, al-
though state statutes regulate the petition process, the state involvement is
ministerial in nature and cannot be characterized as state action. Finally,
Section III.C contends that, while some courts interpret state action to cover
the actions of private citizens during the political nomination process, the
nomination process and the petition circulation process are sufficiently dis-
tinct to bar a parallel application of the reasoning applied in those
circumstances.
A. Private Citizens Are Not State Actors
Actions by private citizens are not actions of the state, and therefore do
not constitute state action.3° The right to initiate legislation through the peti-
tion circulation process is a right expressly reserved to citizens in the state
constitution.13 The VRA prohibits certain actions "imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision,' '3 2 but has no parallel prohibition for private
action.
Courts have held the phrase "state or political subdivision" does not per-
tain to private individuals acting in the course of private political campaigns. 133Because private citizens running for state office are not covered by the VRA,
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000) (applying only to a "State or political subdivision").
129. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (holding that the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) is unconstitutional because it applies to private citizens, and distin-
guishing VAWA from the VRA because the VRA only applies to states and state officials while
VAWA applies nationally).
130. See Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 192 n. 11 (1999) ("Nothing
in this opinion should be read to suggest that initiative-petition circulators are agents of the State.
Although circulators are subject to state regulation and are accountable to the State for compliance
with legitimate controls .... circulators act on behalf of themselves or the proponents of ballot ini-
tiatives.") (citation omitted).
131. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2; COLO. CONsT. art. V, § 1; see also Meyer v. Grant,
486 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1988) (stating that because the right to initiative remains reserved to the
people, the state cannot diminish or impede that process); Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603, 609
(10th Cir. 1988) (clarifying that when you circulate a petition you exercise an individual right solely
for yourself, not for the state).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
133. See, e.g., Welch v. McKenzie, 765 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that fraud
committed against black voters did not violate the VRA because the "fraudulent acts causing the
deprivation were committed by [a white candidate] and his supporters, not by the county registrar
.... Because Section 2 only affords redress for voting practices 'imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision,' [the white candidate's] chicanery is not a Voting Rights Act infringement.").
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private citizens circulating petitions should not be covered. The conduct of
private citizens during political campaigns has at least as much impact on
the election as the conduct of petition circulators.'3 If courts are unwilling
to ignore the state action requirement in the one context, there is no argu-
ment for why they should ignore it in the initiative petition context. Further,
the clear statement rule of statutory construction counsels against interpret-
ing a statute in a manner that will significantly alter the balance between
federal and state governments on issues of fundamental rights or policies.
3
1
To argue that private citizens are state actors requires interpreting a state's
granting of authority to circulate petitions as transforming private citizens
into state actors. Private citizens circulating petitions are acting on their own
behalf and not for the state. While many states authorize private citizens to
seek signatures for proposed initiatives, citizens are "not state officials or
employees" and do "not act with the aid of or together with state officials or
employees in soliciting signatures" and so do not act under color of state
authority. 
36
B. Actions By State Officials Are Ministerial in Nature
Ministerial actions by state officials do not constitute state action be-
cause the state official lacks discretion. 37 The majority of courts hold that
when state officials certify petitions for circulation, approve signatures, and
place petitions on ballots, their actions are ministerial in nature and there-
fore do not amount to state action. 3' State involvement is best described as
regulatory, designed to ensure that the initiative process is fair and impar-
tial. 39 Despite state involvement, petition circulators retain authority, as
134. See Coleman v. Bd. of Educ., 990 F. Supp. 221, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that letters
and phone calls warning voters that voting for minority candidates would decrease property values
and hurt education did not state a claim under section 2 because they were not implemented by an
official state actor). To compare this "racially targeted fraud" with the statements of the MCRI peti-
tion circulators, see supra Section I.C.
135. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 89, at 367-75. Extending section 2 of the VRA to include
petition circulators would alter the balance between federal and state governments by radically
extending the range of activities which could transform a private citizen into a state actor.
136. Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Casey, 781 F. Supp. 1511, 1515 (D. Or. 1992) (denying relief in a
§ 1983 action brought against private-citizen petition circulators because they were not state actors).
137. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F2d 603, 609-10 (10th Cir. 1988); see also Jackson v. Metro.
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (holding that state regulation is insufficient to convert private
action into state action).
138. See, e.g., Padilla v. Lever (Padilla 11), 463 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006); Montero, 861
F.2d at 609-10 (holding that despite the fact that state actors performed some ministerial actions in
preparing the petition for circulation, the right to circulate a petition was reserved by law for the
people and those who did so were not acting pursuant to authority); Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d
1489, 1495-97 (11 th Cir. 1988) (holding that since the right to petition was reserved for the people,
the ministerial duties of state officials could not bring the distribution of the petition under the scope
of the VRA). But see Padilla v. Lever (Padilla 1), 429 F.3d 910, 924 (9th Cir. 2005), withdrawn en
banc, 446 F3d 963 (9th Cir. 2006); Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL
2514115, at *15 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006) (holding that such actions by state officials are suffi-
cient to satisfy the state action requirement of section 2).
139. Montero, 861 F.2d at 610.
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evidenced by the fact that they could withdraw their initiative from public
consideration at any time prior to ballot certification without state ap-
proval.'44
State officials' acts are also ministerial because they do not pertain to the
substance of the petition, but merely its form.14' Because states do not judge
petitions' substantive merit, they do not approve or endorse the content or
the behavior of the circulators during the circulation process. Even cases
like Montero v. Meyer 143 and Delgado v. Smith,'44 which involved the content
of the petition, held that the state action requirement of the VRA was not
fulfilled. In contrast, Massachusetts's treatment of initiative petitions pro-
vides an example of government involvement in an initiative petition which
could amount to state action. Massachusetts prints initiative petitions, pro-
vides them to its electorate, and pays for the cost of printing. 4 The Court in
Delgado used the level of involvement by Massachusetts's government as a
primary means of distinguishing the petition at issue in the case, which had
not been paid for or provided by the government.' 46 Thus, absent involve-
ment by the state in either the content or the funding of the petition, state
involvement does not transform the acts of private citizens into state actors.
Although the Operation King's Dream court recently concluded that pri-
vate citizens circulating an initiative petition were acting under color of state
law, 141 the court conflated political participation with state action. The court
held that the state action came not from the ministerial acts of state officials,
but rather from the notion that circulating a petition to get an initiative on
the ballot transformed the circulators into part of the "political machinery"
of the state. 4 As part of the "political machinery," the court held, petition
circulators are precluded from relying on their status as a private association
to deny that they engaged in state action under the VRA.
14
1
Characterizing private citizens who circulate petitions as "part of the
state's political machinery for choosing which issues would be placed on the
140. Id. at 609.
141. See MIcH. COMp. LAWS §§ 168.471 to 168.482 (1979); see also Duke v. Cleland, 783 F
Supp. 600, 604-05 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (finding no state action and denying a preliminary injunction
where the state printed election ballots according to a list provided by the political party, because the
state neither approved nor endorsed the actions of the political party).
142. Delgado, 861 F.2d at 1497 ("The state does not ... address the merits of the proposal
.... Rather, all of this action is taken by private citizens.").
143. 861 F.2d at 610.
144. 861 F2d at 1496.
145. MASS. CONST. amend, art. XLVItI, pt. 2, § 3.
146. Delgado, 861 F.2d at 1497 n.7 (finding no section 2 violation because the acts of private
citizens could not trigger state action, while suggesting that there could be state action in other
situations, like the government involvement in Massachusetts).
147. Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115, at *15 (E.D.
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state's general election ballot"'5 0 is flawed because all citizens can be in-
volved in choosing which issues will be on the ballot. If casting a ballot is
involvement in the "political machinery," all voters would be state actors-a
result the court could not have intended. Registered voters have the opportu-
nity to influence issues in an election through candidate nominations,
primary elections, signing petitions, town meetings, and various other
means. In this sense, all voters act as part of the "state's political machin-
ery." An interpretation of state action that includes all voters eliminates any
distinction between state and private action. Even if this "political machin-
ery" theory is plausible, the White Primary cases the court relied upon
involved facts that are easily distinguishable from an initiative petition cir-
culation 5' and were decided prior to the enactment of the VRA, so they
cannot be relied upon to properly interpret the VRA's state action require-
ment.
C. Distinguishing Nomination and Initiative Petitions
Petition circulators are distinguishable from the political party nomina-
tion process, which is considered state action, because the outcome of
petition circulation is fundamentally different. This distinction is critical to
maintaining that state action does not apply to the actions of petition circula-
tors. In Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia,"' the Supreme Court held
that the actions of private citizens during the party primary constituted state
action. By extending state action to the decisions of a political party, Morse
significantly expanded the state action doctrine in VRA cases.'53 At issue in
Morse was the implementation of a thirty-five dollar registration fee neces-
sary to attend the state convention, a change from the previous year for
which the Republican Party did not seek preclearance. 4 Because Virginia
automatically puts candidates nominated by the Republican and Democratic
parties on the ballot, 55 the Court concluded that in deciding who would be
on the general election ballot the parties were acting under the authority of
Virginia. 156
The outcome of Morse was largely based on concerns raised in a series
of cases collectively known as the White Primary Cases. 5 7 The White Pri-
mary cases sought to address the fact that although black citizens could vote
in the general election, this right was essentially nullified by white citizens
150. Id.
151. See infra Section lUC.
152. 517 U.S. 186 (1996).
153. See id. at 276 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154. See generally id. at 190-92 (Kennedy, J., judgment of the Court) (plurality opinion).
155. This is different from independents or other candidates who have to declare candidacy
and demonstrate support through a nominating petition. Id. at 195-96.
156. Id. at 197.
157. Id. at 199 (referring to one of the White Primary Cases to aid in the Court's reasoning).
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excluding blacks from the primaries, thus ensuring that only candidates pre-
ferred by whites gained access to the ballot.'58 The first case to address the
issue struck down a Texas statute that made primaries open only to whites.'59
The Texas legislature responded by passing a statute permitting political
party executive committees to determine who would be eligible to vote in
their primaries, and the Democratic party decided to exclude nonwhites from
their primary. 6° The Supreme Court held the Texas statute unconstitutional on
the theory that exclusionary decisions of an executive committee are quintes-
sentially governmental in nature, and the Court thus rendered the parties
agents of the state.' 6' Texas subsequently responded with a new statute that
allowed state primary conventions to determine party membership. 62 The Su-
preme Court struck down this statute as well, holding that the Fifteenth
Amendment ban on discrimination applies to private associations:
If the state requires a certain electoral procedure, prescribes a general elec-
tion ballot made up of party nominees so chosen and limits the choice of
the electorate in general elections for state offices, practically speaking, to
those whose names appear on such a ballot, it endorses, adopts and en-
forces the discrimination against Negroes, practiced by a party entrusted
by Texas law with the determination of the qualifications of participants in
the primary."'
While these cases all pre-date the VRA, they provide useful examples of the
types of systematic discrimination that the VRA sought to redress.
Petition circulation, however, is distinct from the analysis in Morse.
First, the impact that a political party primary has on the election is neces-
sarily different than the impact of an initiative circulation. The various
nomination and primary elections held by political parties ultimately yield
one candidate whose name appears on the ballot. Excluding one segment of
the population from the nominating process could result in their first choice
being excluded from the ballot. 64 This problem does not arise when circulat-
ing an initiative or referendum petition. If a person is denied a chance to
sign the petition, or if he is confused by what he is signing, both options
158. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). These cases are collectively referred to as the White Pri-
mary cases.
159. Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927) (invalidating Texas statute prohibiting
blacks from voting in primary elections).
160. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932).
161. Id. at 88-89 (holding that a political party's executive committee becomes a state actor
when a state legislature gives it a power that is independent from the will of the entire party).
162. Smith, 321 U.S. at 658 (describing the reenactment of the Texas statute).
163. Id. at 664, 666 (overruling Grovey, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)); see also Terry, 345 U.S. at 469-
70 (striking down use of "Jaybird" primaries prior to the general party primaries).
164. For example, if black citizens are excluded from the Democratic presidential primaries,
they will have no say regarding which Democrat appears on the ballot in the ultimate presidential
election. Thus, a Democratic candidate who is sympathetic to the concerns of black citizens could
be eliminated during the primaries, making the candidate who does appear on the final ballot less
appealing to black Democrats than might otherwise have been the case.
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(yes or no) will still be presented to the voter on the day of the election.
Thus, any analogy between primaries and petitions is inadequate because
exclusion from one eliminates potential choices while exclusion from the
other does not.
Second, state involvement in the two processes is sufficiently distin-
guishable such that private citizens engaged in a constitutionally protected
right to enact legislation through initiative petitions should not be consid-
ered state actors. Many courts interpret the White Primary cases and Morse
to hold that "when a State prescribes an election process that gives a special
role to political parties, it 'endorses, adopts and enforces the discrimina-
tion.' "'65 States that have ballot initiatives also have standard procedures that
private citizens must follow in order to place an initiative on the ballot in an
election. Because states apply the procedures categorically, and because
they grant no exceptions, the imprimatur of the State is absent. Without the
imprimatur of the state as in Morse, there is no state action.
66
CONCLUSION
Despite the good intentions of the court in Operation King's Dream, the
court erred in applying section 2 of the VRA to the initiative petition proc-
ess. Section 2 of the VRA cannot apply to petition circulation because the
statute was not designed to deal with procedures outside of the electoral
process. Additionally, the actions of petition circulators are the actions of
private citizens, and thus lack the necessary state action to violate the VRA.
165. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 573 (2000) (emphasis added) (holding that
California's blanket primary violated political parties' right of association).
166. See id. at 572-73.
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